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ACTION AND REASON: POLYBIUS AND THE GAP BETWEEN ENCOMIUM AND HISTORY

SCOTT T. FARRINGTON

GREEK BIOGRAPHY PRESENTS to us the unique opportunity to examine the development of a literary genre. Knowing the finer details of this development could deepen our understanding of the nature of Greek literature, in particular the Greek concept of literary genre. Furthermore, an understanding of biography as a literary form might shed light on changing Greek attitudes about the role of the individual in history.

To determine whether Nepos or Plutarch established the genre of biography or whether they participated in an established genre, one must search for antecedents, direct and indirect. The search is tempting because we have fourth-century works that might rightly be called biographies, like Aristoxenus' lives of Pythagoras, Archytas, Socrates, and Plato. In addition, the prose of Isocrates and Xenophon shows a close concern with the details of their subjects' lives. It is clear that biographical material is a thread common to encomium, biography, and historiography.¹

On the other hand, the attempt to draw a definitive link between Nepos or Plutarch and any of their possible antecedents presents a unique challenge. As John Marincola has argued, "genre is not a static concept, functioning as a 'recipe' with a fixed set of ingredients that the work must contain, but rather is dynamic and should be seen as a 'strategy of literary composition.'"² Polybius, who often expresses his opinions regarding the elements proper to historiography and the ways in which a properly written history differs from other literary genres, provides an excellent opportunity to examine an ancient author participating in and innovating the prose forms.

In addition to the many comments he makes regarding historical composition, Polybius describes to us one of his earlier works—a three-book-long

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1. On the close relationship of these forms, cf. Fortenbaugh 2007, 60; Schepens 2007, 336.

2. Marincola 1999, 282.

encomiastic prose work on Philopoemen. Plutarch names Polybius as a source for his life of Philopoemen (Plut. *Phil.* 16.4), and it is possible that he took generic inspiration from the earlier author. In these works, therefore, we have an intersection between history, encomium, and biography.

At present, little agreement exists regarding the relationship that these three forms share.³ More disagreement exists regarding what light Polybius sheds on that relationship. Some scholars argue that he defines the *Philopoemen* as an encomium.⁴ Often the work is called a biography.⁵ Most consider the *Philopoemen* a hybrid: encomiastic biography.⁶ I will proceed by first arguing that Polybius unambiguously, and with an informed literary sensibility, defines his *Philopoemen* as an encomium. Second, I will show that he contemplates biographical material only in the context of encomium or history, either of which can take the life of an individual as its focus. From there, I will examine the precise distinction Polybius makes between his *Philopoemen* and his *Histories*. Finally, I will argue that the more philosophical blend of protreptic and descriptive moralism that characterizes history is a departure from encomium's purely protreptic call to virtue; this departure reflects the contrast between the epideictic nature of encomium and historiography's wider rhetorical stance.

1. POLYBIUS' DEFINITION OF HIS *PHILOPOEMEN*

In Book 10 of the *Histories*, Polybius narrates Philopoemen's service as hiparch of the Achaean League (10.21.2):⁷

τοῦ δὲ καιροῦ τοῦ κατὰ τὴν διήγησιν ἐφεστακότος ἡμᾶς ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν τῶν Φιλοποίμενος πράξων, καθήκειν ἡγοῦμεθα, καθάπερ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ἀξιολόγων ἀνδρῶν τὰς ἐκάστων ἀγωγὰς καὶ φύσεις ἐπειράθημεν ὑποδεικνύναι, καὶ περὶ τούτου ποιῆσαι τὸ παραπλήσιον.

Since the sequence of my narrative has put me at the beginning of the accomplishments of Philopoemen, I think it proper, just as I have tried in regard to other noteworthy men to show the training and character of each, to do similarly regarding him.

In the end, however, he refrains from providing a full examination of his subject's life, training, or disposition (10.21.5–7):

εἰ μὲν οὖν μὴ κατ' ἰδίαν ἐπεποιήμεθα τὴν περὶ αὐτοῦ σύνταξιν, ἐν ᾗ διεσαφύμεν καὶ τίς ἦν καὶ τίνων καὶ τίσιν ἀγωγαῖς ἐχρήσατο νέος ὢν, ἀναγκαῖον ἦν ὑπὲρ ἐκάστου τῶν προειρημένων φέρειν ἀπολογισμὸν· ἐπεὶ δὲ πρότερον ἐν τρισὶ βυβλίοις ἐκτὸς ταύτης τῆς

3. E.g., Momigliano 1993, 82–83; encomium is similar to history and biography; Walbank 1970 (hereafter *HCP*), ad 10.21.8: encomium is not as true as history.

4. E.g., Schissel 1926, passim; Geiger 1985, 35–36; Sacks 1981, 172; Momigliano 1993, 82; Tuplin 2000, 128; Fortenbaugh 2007, 68.

5. E.g., Strachan-Davidson 1888, 6; Osley 1946, 18; Ziegler 1952, col. 1472; Treu 1954, 223; Petzold 1969, 97; Errington 1969, 232; Lehmann 1974, 158; Dihle 1987, 10; Marincola 1997, 19; 2001, 114; Oliver 2006, 115; Walbank and Habicht 2010, 373 n. 74.

6. E.g., Leo 1901, 227; Pédech 1951, 83; Walbank *HCP*, ad 10.21.7; Pédech 1964, 45; Homeyer 1963, 155; Petzold 1969, 12 n. 5; Walbank 1972, 14; Dihle 1987, 9; Gentili and Cerri 1988, 83; Eckstein 1995, 16 n. 68, 30, and 61, though on 31 it is an “encomium,” and on 148 it is “an encomiastic biography—a biography”; Champion 2004, 20 and 223; Walbank and Habicht 2010, xv.

7. All text of Polybius is from Büttner-Wobst's Teubner edition (1964). I have preserved his convention of marking insertions into the text with parentheses. All translations are mine.

συντάξεως τὸν ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ πεποιήμεθα λόγον, τὴν τε παιδικὴν ἀγωγὴν διασαφούντες καὶ τὰς ἐπιφανεστάτας πράξεις, δῆλον ὡς ἐν τῇ νῦν ἐξηγήσει πρέπον ἂν εἴη τῆς μὲν νεωτερικῆς ἀγωγῆς καὶ τῶν νεωτερικῶν ζήλων κατὰ μέρος ἀφελεῖν, τοῖς δὲ κατὰ τὴν ἀκμὴν αὐτοῦ κεφαλαιωδῶς ἐκεῖ δεδηλωμένοις ἔργοις προσθεῖναι καὶ κατὰ μέρος, ἵνα τὸ πρέπον ἑκατέρῃ τῶν συντάξεων τηρῶμεν.

If, therefore, I had not already produced a separate work about him, in which I made clear who he was, from whom he descended, and how he was trained in his youth, I would necessarily have to give an account of each of the aforementioned here. But since I have earlier given an account of him in three books outside of the present narrative, in which I made clear both his boyhood training and his most illustrious accomplishments, it is clearly fitting, in order to preserve the proper character of each treatise, to abridge the details of the training and ambitions of his youth in the present narrative and to add detail to the deeds of his acme, which were summarily described in that work.

He goes on to explain the differing natures of the two works more clearly (10.21.8):

ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐκεῖνος ὁ τόπος, ὑπάρχων ἐγκωμιαστικός, ἀπῆτει τὸν κεφαλαιώδη καὶ μετ' αὐξήσεως τῶν πράξεων ἀπολογισμὸν, οὕτως ὁ τῆς ἱστορίας, κοινὸς ὢν ἐπαίνου καὶ ψόγου, ζητεῖ τὸν ἀληθῆ καὶ τὸν μετ' ἀποδείξεως καὶ τῶν ἐκάστοις παρεπομένων συλλογισμῶν.

For just as that work, being an encomium, demands a summary narration with amplification of the accomplishments, so does this work of history, impartial concerning praise and blame, demand a true account and one supported by a demonstration of the reasoning accompanying each action.

From here, Polybius tells us that Philopoemen was born into one of the noblest families of Arcadia, that he was educated by Cleander of Mantinea, and later associated with Ecdelus and Megalophanes.⁸ When the Achaean League appointed him hipparch (210/9), he found the troops suffering from poor morale, instituted several reforms, and personally supervised their drill until they exceeded his own standards.

The sentences I have quoted above relate everything that can be known with certainty about the nature and content of the *Philopoemen*. It was three books long. It preceded the *Histories*. It discussed the man, his ancestry, and his education. In addition, it gave an account of his most illustrious deeds. These were addressed in summary fashion and with amplification, features made necessary by the encomiastic nature of the work.

Some scholars have alleged that the adjective Polybius uses to describe the *Philopoemen*—ἐγκωμιαστικός—is ambiguous. Albrecht Dihle has argued that the adjective can describe a biography.⁹ On the contrary, the adjective is a technical term and its meaning is clear. William W. Fortenbaugh, in his analysis of adjectives in -ικός, compares Polybius' use to Anaximenes', "where it is used in the neuter to distinguish the encomium from censure, *qua* species of epideictic oratory."¹⁰ In fact, Anaximenes uses the adjective to identify

8. The names are sometimes transmitted as Ecdemus and Demophanes, cf. Walbank *HCP*, ad 10.22.2.

9. Dihle 1987, 12: "Seine Charakterisierung als ἐγκωμιαστικός läßt keinen bindenden Schluß zu, weil auch eine Biographie, die nicht nach den Regeln des Enkomion aufgebaut ist, diese Eigenschaft haben kann."

10. Fortenbaugh 2007, 68. He refers to Anaximen. 1.1421b10.

this species of epideictic oratory on more than one occasion (e.g., Anaximen. 3.1425b36–38, 35.1440b5–6). Furthermore, in a book-length study on adjectives in -ικός in Plato, Adolf Ammann demonstrates that these adjectives were used to classify and define new τέχνη as early as the fourth century.¹¹ The adjective ἐγκωμιαστικός does not mean “encomium-like,” but rather “belonging to the encomiastic class or τέχνη,” just as διαλεκτικός does not mean “resembling dialectic,” but “dialectic” itself.

In addition to his terminology, Polybius attributes to the *Philopoemen* the same characteristics given to encomium by Aristotle and Anaximenes. Specifically, he explains that the work presented an amplification of Philopoemen’s actions (μετ’ αὐξήσεως τῶν πράξεων, 10.21.8). Similarly, Aristotle stresses that encomia are of actions (*Rh.* 1.9.1367b21, 1.9.1367b27–28), and is equally clear that encomia amplify the actions they address (*Rh.* 1.9.1368a10). Anaximenes, too, is clear that encomia amplify actions (3.1425b36–38).

Moreover, the contents of the *Philopoemen* Polybius defines are consistent with the contents of ancient prose encomia. The work described who Philopoemen was, from whom he descended, and the education he received in his youth. These first two topics are the same topics Isocrates addresses in his *Euagoras*, in the same order (9.12, 22).¹² High birth and education were topics Aristotle asserted were persuasive in encomia (*Rh.* 1.9.1367b29).

In addition, Polybius could, without doubt, recognize examples of encomia. In fact, he records an encomium. Coincidentally, it was spoken to Philopoemen when the Achaean League received Ptolemy V’s envoys (22.3.8–9). Polybius even reveals knowledge of how the composition of encomium was taught. Timaeus, he argues, spins out his material into a long narrative in order to exaggerate the importance of Syracuse’s role in the Persian War. He explains that the effect of this embellishment is similar to the rhetorical exercises of young students who write encomia of Thersites and defamations of Penelope (12.26b.5). Polybius’ information about the school exercises is entirely accurate. F. W. Walbank points out that encomia of Thersites were written, and one, by Libanius, survives.¹³

Polybius has now used an appropriate term to describe his own work as an encomium, identified characteristics and content appropriate to encomia, recorded an example, and discussed how the form was taught. Additionally, by the time he wrote, encomium had been treated in theory and practice for generations. Discussions of the rhetorical forms were more common than discussions of any other literary prose.¹⁴ Certainly, the form experienced innovations, like being presented in written form or at extraordinary length. Nevertheless, ancient authors discuss the encomium as a genre, and when Polybius defines his *Philopoemen*, he does so in that context.

11. Ammann 1953, 263: “das Adjektiv auf -ικός das **Klassifizierungs-** und **Definitionsmittel** κατ’ ἐξοχήν geworden ist” (emphasis his). See also 267. I would like to thank Eckart Schütrumpf for bringing this book to my attention.

12. Cf. Treu 1954, 221.

13. Cf. Walbank *HCP*, ad loc., where he also points out that defamations of Penelope were more common than encomia of Thersites and gives other examples of these kinds of exercises.

14. Cf. Dihle 1987, 16; Geiger 1985, 12.

2. THE CONTEXTS OF BIOGRAPHICAL MATERIAL

Despite Polybius' clear and informed description, it could be true that the difference between encomium and biography was so slight in antiquity that one might still be justified in considering the *Philopoemen* a biography. This point has been taken up, for instance, by Arnaldo Momigliano, who argued that "[t]he gap between this type of historical encomium and a full biography of a king or of a general is so narrow that any neat separation is impossible."¹⁵ His statement, or at least the sentiment behind it, is widely accepted, and the content of the *Philopoemen*—as described by Polybius—lends this position support. Certainly biographies can treat their subjects' nature, lineage, and education. Polybius, on the other hand, explicitly allows both the historian and the encomiast to consider these topics. Though he never discusses biography as a genre, he does discuss the appropriate uses of biographical material in both encomium and historiography.

Specifically, he states that it is incumbent on a historiographer to relate the training (ἀγωγή) and nature (φύσις) of noteworthy men (10.21.2). As we saw above, he only omits such information regarding *Philopoemen* at the beginning of Book 10 because he treated those topics at length in the earlier work. Biographical material, a narrative account of an individual's life, is not only appropriate to history, it is necessary. Polybius' comments on Theopompus' *Philippica* reveal that he will even allow an entire history to focus on the life of a single individual.

He complains that Theopompus, who started to write the history of Greece, just as he was getting to the most remarkable event, the battle of Leuctra, changed his course and wrote a history of the affairs of Philip II (8.11.3). Polybius does not suggest in any way that he believes Theopompus to have left historiography to write some other form or genre of prose. In fact, in the preceding sentence, he calls Theopompus a historiographer (ἱστοριογράφος, 8.11.2) and elsewhere calls the *Philippica* history (ἱστορία, 8.9.2), but one with a special focus on the life of a single political leader (8.11.5):

οὐδὲ γὰρ προκαταληφθεὶς ὑπὸ βασιλικῆς δυναστείας, καὶ τυχὼν ἐξουσίας, οὐδεὶς ἂν ἐπέσχε σὺν καιρῷ ποιήσασθαι μετέβασιν ἐπὶ τὸ τῆς Ἑλλάδος ὄνομα καὶ πρόσωπον· ἀπὸ δὲ ταύτης ἀρξάμενος καὶ προβὰς ἐπὶ ποσὸν οὐδ' ὅλως οὐδεὶς ἂν ἡλλάξατο μονάρχου πρόσχημα καὶ βίον, ἀκεραίῳ χρόμειος γνώμη.

For no one, not even someone obsessed with a royal dynasty, given the opportunity, having the time, would refrain from making the transition to the title and leading role of Greece; and having started out from that, and having proceeded a little, no one who had sufficient sense would have taken the pomp and the life of a monarch in exchange.

It is true that the *Philopoemen*, according to Polybius' description, contained a significant amount of biographical description. It is further true that such a focus might be appropriate for a biography, according to our modern understanding of the genre. But the *Philippica* also contained a great deal of biographical material concerning a single figure, and it remains by all accounts a

15. Momigliano 1993, 83.

history. Even more revealing is his use of the word ὁ βίος, which would have been an appropriate term to describe a genre of biography, but which Polybius uses to describe only the content of Theopompus' work.

The way Polybius uses this word in particular suggests he was unable to describe a genre of biography in the criticism of the *Philippica*. Even when he derisively, and perhaps unfairly, describes a work as focused on the life of an individual, he calls it a history. I would, therefore, restate the conclusion of Joseph Geiger:

Polybius, as knowledgeable of the historiographical works of earlier and of his own generation as anybody could be, never referred to works of a biographical nature because he never perused such works; and most probably he never perused such works for the simple reason—indeed the simplest reason imaginable—that such works did not exist.¹⁶

Polybius wrote a work, the *Philopoemen*, that took as its primary subject the life and deeds of an individual, and he characterizes the *Philippica* as doing the same. Nevertheless, when he speaks of biographical material, it is in the context of either encomium or history. Works that contain biographical material, even in extraordinary quantities, do not necessarily belong to a genre of biography. Works that are closely related according to their subject matter can remain distinct according to their genre.

3. THE CONTRAST BETWEEN ENCOMIUM AND HISTORY

I would like now to consider how Polybius contrasts his *Philopoemen* and his *Histories*. Before I begin, I will review the dominant scholarly opinions. Momigliano sees no connection between history and biography. He argues:

History remained what the first historians made it: a study of political and military actions. There was no desire to probe deeply into its foundations, to re-examine the role of the individuals in it. Indeed the implicit separation between biography and history of the fifth and fourth centuries B.C. was to become explicit later, at least from Polybius onwards.¹⁷

His position is controversial. For the sake of illustration, I give the stance of Fortenbaugh:

Polybius tells us that an account of the training and ambitions . . . of accomplished individuals benefits the reader: it effects an improvement. . . . Polybius' focus is on history, but what he says applies equally to his earlier, encomiastic work on *Philopoemen*, in which *Philopoemen*'s training and ambitions were discussed in some detail. And we need not stop there. Polybius' point can be extended to biography in general.¹⁸

According to this argument, the link that runs between history and encomium is a shared moral program, and this link extends to biography. From the evidence in Polybius, as I will now argue, it seems rather that a similar moral program connects biography to history, but severs it from encomium.

We must first understand the precise distinction Polybius made at 10.21.8 between the *Philopoemen* and the *Histories*. The encomium demanded a

16. Geiger 1985, 55.

17. Momigliano 1993, 41.

18. Fortenbaugh 2007, 64.

summary narration with amplification of the subject's accomplishments, and the history, impartial concerning praise and blame, demanded a true account supported by a demonstration of the reasoning accompanying each action. Two conclusions might be drawn from this statement: (1) that the amplified account of the encomium differed from the truthful account of the histories, and (2) that the praise of the encomium, necessarily partial, differed from the impartiality of the history. I will consider both points in turn.

Because Polybius, indeed nearly every Greek historiographer, demands that history present the truth, and because he contrasts history and encomium, it is tempting to draw the conclusion that encomium bends the truth through amplification, and that this feature distinguishes the two genres.¹⁹ It is obvious that encomia could distort the truth and heap undeserved praise onto unworthy subjects. Polybius, as we have seen, mentions encomia of Thersites. Further, in explaining why he treated Philip V's devastation of Messenia in such detail, he complains that other writers who have treated the same events present the king's actions, whether due to goodwill or fear, as praiseworthy and virtuous. He complains (8.8.6):

ἐξ ὧν ἱστορίας μὲν οὐδαμῶς ἔχειν αὐτοῖς συμβαίνει διάθεσιν τὰς συντάξεις, ἐγκωμίου δὲ μᾶλλον.

In consequence, their writings turn out in no way to have the character of history, but rather of encomium.

On the other hand, the fact that some encomia were false does not mean that falsehood is a necessary characteristic of the genre. Polybius suggests as much in the very next statement (8.8.7):

ἐγὼ δ' οὕτε λοιδορεῖν ψευδῶς φημι δεῖν τοὺς μονάρχους οὐτ' ἐγκωμιάζειν . . .

But I say that we must not censure or praise monarchs falsely.

Room remains for honest praise and censure, in both encomium and historiography. In fact, it would be bizarre for Polybius, while mentioning his earlier work on Philopoemen—whether he does so to refer the interested reader to a more detailed treatise, or to establish his *bona fides* as an expert whose account can be trusted—to admit that his account was, to any degree whatsoever, fabricated. It is unlikely that the distinction he makes, therefore, is that history is true and encomium is false.

Furthermore, to define encomium exclusively as a falsely exaggerated account demands an unfair definition of αὔξησις. According to Aristotle's description (*Rh.* 1.9.1368a10–26), an amplified account describes whether the subject did anything of note alone, or first, or with a few, or was instrumental. He goes on to explain that the encomiast can mention expectations exceeded because of time or the seasons, as well as repeated successes, distinctions, and honors. One can also compare the subject to illustrious figures, or if that comparison is unflattering, to ordinary people. This last detail is the most telling. One does not falsely exaggerate the subject's accomplishments; one selects and arranges the information in a way that augments the praise of the subject.

19. Cf. Oliver 2006, 116. Similarly, Pédech 1964, 46; Osley 1946, 19.

When Polybius mentions a falsely exaggerated account of a skirmish, he uses the expression “exceeding the truth” (μειζόνως ἢ κατὰ τὴν ἀλήθειαν, 3.103.1).

The second possible contrast, that encomium is partial while history is impartial, contradicts several of Polybius’ programmatic statements. The encomiast must only praise; this is obvious. The historian, on the other hand, must assign praise and blame truthfully and where due, sometimes praising enemies and censuring allies and sometimes even praising and blaming the same individuals.²⁰ Polybius is relentless in his demand that the historian make every effort to rise above patriotism and personal bias. He is the first Greek historiographer to demand that historians rise above the love of their own cities.²¹ To achieve such detachment completely, Polybius admits, is impossible or nearly so,²² but ideally, a historian’s personal bias will not obscure the truth.

It must also be noted that Polybius does not demand that the historian give a balanced presentation of praise and blame. On the contrary, the historian should devote as much space as possible to praiseworthy deeds while only making bare mention of reproachable behavior. Polybius makes this point during the attack on Phylarchus (2.61.1):

τὰς μὲν Μαντινέων ἡμῖν συμφοράς μετ’ αὐξήσεως καὶ διαθέσεως ἐξηγήσατο, δῆλον ὅτι καθήκειν ὑπολαμβάνων τοῖς συγγραφεῦσι τὰς παρανόμους τῶν πράξεων ἐπισημαίνεσθαι.

He tells us at length, with amplification and embroidery, the misfortunes of the Mantinians, clearly because he considers it proper for historians to mark out lawless actions.

This is not a demand for balance. It is more fitting for history to present figures and actions that are worthy of emulation than those that are not.²³

The same point is made more forcefully in the way Polybius handles his account of the Egyptian Agathocles, whom he describes as a drunk, an ostentatious sexual deviant, and hated by those he governed (15.25). He explains that other authors have given too much attention to Agathocles (15.35.1), but is quick to point out (15.36.1–2):

τὸν μετ’ αὐξήσεως λόγον ἀπεδοκιμάσαμεν ὑπὲρ Ἀγαθοκλέους . . .

I refrained from an amplified account of [the Egyptian] Agathocles . . .

20. Cf. Polyb. 1.14.7, 16.28.5. For examples of criticism of his own friends, cf. Eckstein 1995, 25. For examples of praising and blaming the same individuals or groups, regardless of their relationship to the author, cf. Walbank and Habicht 2010, xx.

21. Luce 1989, 20.

22. Polyb. 16.14.6: ἐγὼ δὲ διότι μὲν δεῖ ῥοπὰς δίδοναι ταῖς αὐτῶν πατρίσι τοὺς συγγραφεάς, συγχωρήσαιμ’ ἂν, οὐ μὴν τὰς ἐναντίας τοῖς συμβεβηκόσιν ἀποφάσεις ποιείσθαι περὶ αὐτῶν (“I could allow that authors necessarily tip the scales in favor of their countries but not indeed that they must make statements that contradict events”). Walbank (*HCP*, 1: 12–13, and note ad 16.14.6), translating (with Paton) “I would admit that authors should show partiality,” finds a “concession to patriotism.” Eckstein (1987, 150 and 159) argues that Polybius allows for patriotism as long as it does not violate the truth. It is possible that Polybius simply grants that true impartiality is unattainable. Such is the position of Walbank (1933, 11): “it is the prejudice which lies deep in a writer’s mind, and occasions a slight and unconscious bias in his work.” Understood this way, the statement is consistent with the opinion that involuntary falsehood can be forgiven but deliberate misstatement cannot (e.g., 12.7.6, 12.12.4). At 16.20.8–9 and at 29.12.6–12, he begs pardon for involuntary errors, but not deliberate misrepresentation. At 12.5.1–4, he explains that although the Locrians have bestowed on him many honors, he accepts Aristotle’s unflattering account of their history. At 18.14.11–12, he argues that Demosthenes erred because he judged all Greeks according to the interests of Athens alone.

23. Polybius tends to uphold his stricture against lascivious detail, cf. Pomeroy 1986, 409.

The historian ought to devote more time to praise than to blame and should not amplify his account. Obviously, there are times the historian is compelled to describe immoral behavior, but history can, indeed ought to, focus its attention primarily on the praiseworthy.

Polybius' treatment of Philip V both illustrates his treatment of biographical material throughout the *Histories* and provides an example of an individual who must be both praised and blamed. Polybius praises the king's early campaigns in the Social War, when he began to win a favorable reputation and to exhibit qualities that lead to political success (4.77.1–3). He adds that the influences that led to Philip's degeneration will be presented later in the narrative.

Before that promise is fulfilled, he narrates the sack of Thermum, an event that provides the first opportunity for outright censure (5.8.1–12.8). Yet Polybius' account minimizes the beginnings of the sack. He states merely that Philip was able to plunder the neighboring towns, overrun the plain surrounding Thermum, and despoil the houses within (5.8.4). The following morning, the men divide the valuable loot and burn the remainder. Polybius asserts that these actions were right and in accordance with the laws of war, but about the rest—how the men burned the stoas and their dedications, toppled some two thousand statues, and graffitied the walls—he is uncertain how to proceed (5.9.1). Philip justified these actions as recompense for the Aetolian outrages at Dium and Dodona. Polybius explicitly rejects this excuse and defends his position with a discussion of Cleomenes, Philip II, and Alexander, who behaved in more just ways in similar situations. In the end, Polybius concludes that Philip should be forgiven for these actions, as his decisions were due to his advisors, whose negative influence he will discuss more completely elsewhere (5.12.5–8).

The use of biographical material in these episodes is a fine example of Polybius' practice. The decisions and choices an individual made are introduced, but as simple events, they interest the author very little. Rather, what grabs Polybius' attention is the context, the chain of consequences each event follows or begins. Philip's early reputation is due to his natural ability; the change of his reputation was due to the men whose advice he took. He did not emulate his ancestors, though they provided many worthy examples. As a result, he committed sacrilege and diminished his political capital.

When Polybius fulfills his promise to discuss the revolution in Philip's character, he makes clear that the analysis is for the sake of example and particularly useful for those men of action who want to correct their own behavior through the study of history (7.11.2). The reader is given the opportunity to succeed where Philip failed. Polybius follows the statement with high praise of Philip's conduct prior to the attack on Messene. Philip then sacrifices and takes counsel with Aratus and Demetrius, who gives the advice that leads to the revolution in Philip's character and reputation. It was through Demetrius' influence that Philip committed the outrages at Thermum, Crete, and Messene, a course of events that illustrates the importance young kings should place on the selection of their friends (7.14.6).

Philip's outrages continue: Rhodes, Egypt, Cius, Thasos, and Pergamum (13.3–5, 15.20–24, 16.1). A hint of his former self shows up in Attica

(16.28.7–8, 34.1–12),²⁴ and then comes Cynoscephalae. After Philip's defeat, Polybius stresses his own demonstrative method: just as he related Philip's early impulses and change for the worse μετ' ἀποδείξεως, so too will he narrate his subsequent noble behavior (18.33.6–7). The aim is to determine, through a process of demonstration, which behavior deserves praise and which censure. In this way, his treatment of Philip achieves not balance, but nuance.

Polybius' treatment of Antiochus is quite similar to that of Philip. He behaves nobly in his early endeavors, as at Bactria when he is wounded and gains a reputation for courage (10.49.14). When he dies, however, he has failed to fulfill his early promise (15.37.1–2). In the case of Heracleides (of Tarentum), the pattern is nearly inverted (13.4). He is naturally inclined toward evil and endowed with a talent for unscrupulous behavior. Tyrannical to inferiors, sycophantic to superiors, he betrays his own hometown to the Romans, whom in turn he attempts to betray to Hannibal. He joins Philip's court and exercises a disastrous influence on the king, but his negative qualities serve him well when he is charged with the destruction of the Rhodian navy.

Polybius' treatment of Aratus follows the same demonstrative pattern. However, in this case, the account is of one of Polybius' heroes; therefore, the author has an opportunity to distort the truth through exaggeration, and such distortion is often alleged.²⁵ Aratus' early career meets with great praise (2.43–45). Though only twenty years of age, he freed his city from tyranny. During his second στρατηγία, he liberated Corinth and its citadel from Antigonus Gonatas. He won Megara for the Achaean League and tirelessly fought the Peloponnesian tyrants, who submitted to Aratus' will one after another. The alliance the Aetolians formed with Antigonus Doson and Cleomenes would have crushed the Achaeans but for Aratus (2.45.5).

Polybius also criticizes Aratus: his seizure of Acrocorinth in 243 is an injustice (2.50.9). He exhibits many disadvantages in the field: he thinks too slowly, he is timid, he flees from danger (4.8.5). As a result of these personal failings, he filled the Peloponnese with monuments of his defeats (4.8.6). Polybius then illustrates Aratus' military shortcomings with a detailed narration of one of his failures. He mismanaged the battle of Caphyae so badly that it is impossible to surpass his stupidity (4.11.1). Even if the early praises are distorted, Aratus suffers censure in due course.

One cannot deny that there are many similarities between these accounts and Polybius' own description of encomium. These narratives praise characteristics of Philip and Aratus that are revealed through the prose narration of biographical material. In the case of Philip, praiseworthy action is presented and stressed. In the case of Aratus, the praise might even be an exaggerated distortion. Both accounts consider the individuals' innate qualities, their nobility, and their early achievements, subjects Polybius treated in the *Philopoemen*. Like *Philopoemen*'s early achievements in the *Histories*, the narrative of Aratus' administrations is treated summarily, and the reason is again because it was treated in more detail in a previous work (2.40.4).

24. On Polybius' assessment of Philip's moral recovery, cf. Eckstein 1995, 259; Champion 2004, 151.

25. E.g., Walbank and Habicht 2010, 395 n. 107.

History cannot focus exclusively on praise, but even with Philip the behavior that deserves censure is introduced with warnings to the reader. The reader is encouraged to learn the difference between good behavior and bad, and behave accordingly. Though the balance of history still tends toward praise, a characteristic that it shares with encomium, its considered approach to biographical material is more similar to later biography than to encomium. Plutarch does not only praise his subjects, as we can see in the *Life of Aratus*. There, Aratus is a clever strategist, but a coward in the field (*Arat.* 10.2). In this way, his biography is more similar to the *Histories* than to Polybius' *Philopoemen*. That is to say, unlike the epideictic encomium, history (and later biography) attempts not only to convince the reader that behavior is praiseworthy, but also to judge the behavior.

4. THE ROLE OF DEMONSTRATION

Polybius is aware of the protreptic effect his historical narrative has on the reader. This quality also belongs to encomium. But Polybius, by his own standard, must assign praise and blame to friends and enemies alike. This mixture of praise and censure, in light of the narrative's tendency to produce emulation, demands a degree of analysis if the reader is going to learn the proper lesson from the events at hand. Polybius distinguishes history and encomium precisely by the presence or absence of this analysis: his own encomium was developed with amplification (μετ' αὐξήσεως), and his history with demonstration (μετ' ἀποδείξεως). Demonstration, a process wherein the reader judges the behavior and is encouraged to emulate it by taking particular actions, is the gap between encomium and historiography.

Polybius uses the term "demonstration" to refer to his own method in the *Histories* on many occasions. At 10.21.8, as we have seen, he defines the term as a consideration of the reasoning accompanying each action, but there are several passages where he uses this or a related term to describe his method. In one example, he associates demonstration with an analysis of causes (3.1.3). Such passages suggest, as Paul Pédech argues, that demonstration is not just a simple outline of cause and effect, but an entire apparatus of proofs, arguments, evidence, and references by which the historian supports his assertions.²⁶ Polybius contrasts this method to one that provides the assertions alone (4.40.1). The demonstration shows not only the cause and effect, but provides support to show that each element has been properly identified. The determination of cause and effect is a necessary feature of history because it confers a benefit on the reader (3.32.6, 11.18a.1–3). That benefit is moral and practical instruction (3.31.11–13).

Though Polybius contrasts encomium and history according to method, the terms he uses are not rigid distinctions. As I have already argued, he allows encomia to be true or false. He also refers to the necessity of making a display of details in history (ἐπιδεικνύμενος, 11.18a.3). The envoy of Ptolemy who

26. Pédech 1964, 45. His stance is an elaboration of previous positions, e.g., Schweighäuser 1822, 52: *cum explicatione caussarum exponere vel narrare res*. Strachan-Davidson 1888, 5: "a narrative dealing in proofs and arguments, showing how and why things happened, tracing the relations of cause and effect."

performs for Philopoemen an amplified encomium also offers several demonstrations of his praises (καί τινας ἀποδείξεις προεφέρετο, 22.3.8). Therefore, Karl-Ernst Petzold's point, that a demonstrative account must somehow be opposed to a summary account, is well taken;²⁷ still, a demand for absolutes is too much. Polybius is describing the primary characteristics of each genre; other characteristics are not excluded but subordinated.

Furthermore, it is striking that Polybius uses demonstration to distinguish history from encomium because he frequently emphasizes the process of demonstration in his treatment of biographical material, thus widening the gap between biography and encomium. As we have seen, Philip's actions, like Philopoemen's, are narrated μετ' ἀποδείξεως, and in many places throughout the *Histories*, Polybius explains that he considers individuals' lives at length so that the reader can learn from the account.

In his consideration of Hannibal's character, Polybius restricts himself to the qualities that are most in dispute, namely, whether Hannibal was excessively cruel or avaricious (9.22.7–10). He first digresses on the difficulty of assessing the true qualities of political and military leaders, as they are often forced to act in ways contrary to their own principles. Hannibal's advisors and the necessity of his circumstances limited his options while in Italy. In the end, Polybius reiterates that the general was known among Romans for cruelty but for avarice among Carthaginians (9.26.11).

Similarly, Polybius addresses the character of Scipio Africanus because no truthful account has yet been given (10.2.3). In this case, however, he makes an interesting addition to his project, namely, that the truth of his own account of Africanus' deeds will be proven by the readers' ability to fully appreciate those deeds for the first time (10.2.4). The statement reveals the heart of the difference between the *Histories'* treatment of the individual and an encomiastic one. Biographical material is introduced in the historical narrative not only because it is praiseworthy, but also so the reader can form a more considered opinion of individuals' qualities and actions and thereby gain the ability to determine what is noble or successful or admirable and then put that knowledge into action.

Polybius explains that the available accounts of Africanus have attributed his success primarily to chance. In reality, he was similar to Lycurgus, who also attributed his plans to divine inspiration in order to encourage his subordinates to carry out his orders (10.2.8–12). Then Polybius sets the thesis that Africanus did everything according to calculation and forethought (10.2.13). Africanus' intelligence, particularly his faculty of reason (λογισμός) and foresight (πρόνοια) is the focus of the following discussion. He saved his father, the commanding general, at Ticinus, but rarely risked his own life when he was the commanding general. This behavior is a quality of intelligence (10.3.7). Reasoning (λογιζόμενος, 10.4.3) that his brother was likely to fail in his bid for the aedileship, he hatched a plan to use his own popularity to get both of them elected, and won his mother's approval for his own candidacy

27. Petzold 1969, 14, 17. He follows Strachan-Davidson 1888, 6, and is followed by Sacks 1981, 173–74.

by relating to her a fabricated dream full of propitious omens.²⁸ The plan worked, not due to divine intervention, but due to reasoning and foresight (ἐκ λογισμοῦ (καὶ) προνοίας, 10.5.8).

Polybius then resumes his narrative of the capture of New Carthage, but asserts that this event, too, supports his contention that Africanus succeeded through intelligence (10.5.9–10). He stresses that all preparations were made with careful calculation (ὧν οὐδὲν ἦν χωρὶς ἐκλογισμῶν τῶν ἀκριβεστάτων, 10.6.12). He again complains that authors fail to attribute Africanus' success to foresight (πρόνοιαν, 10.9.2). After the battle, he adds that, because Scipio had the foresight (πρόνοιαν, 10.17.16) to offer the captive townspeople freedom in exchange for service in the navy, he increased his fleet by half. His account is not one of praise alone, or even of praise balanced with censure; it is a fuller consideration how biographical qualities can affect the outcome of events.

Not only does Polybius use the demonstrative aspect of history to distinguish it from encomium, he also suggests that historians who employ amplification do so at the expense of demonstration and sacrifice the instructive element of their history along the way. We saw this opinion already in the case of Phylarchus, and he makes a similar complaint regarding Timaeus (12.15.10):

ὁ δ' ἐπεσκοτημένος ὑπὸ τῆς ἰδίας πικρίας τὰ μὲν ἐλαττώματα δυσμενικῶς καὶ μετ' αὐξήσεως ἡμῖν ἐξηγγέλκε, τὰ δὲ κατωρθώματα συλλήβδην παραλέλοιπεν . . .

Blinded by personal bitterness, he narrates for us inimically and with amplification Agathocles' defeats, but entirely passes over his successes . . .

Here Polybius demands praise and censure of the same figure, but one must also demonstrate why each action deserves praise and censure. Timaeus is accused of misunderstanding an essential function of historiography. Polybius, in contrast, revised the entire plan of his *Histories* so the reader could make a more reasoned assessment whether Rome was praiseworthy, just, or worthy of imitation (3.4.1–8). We can see the consequences of the distinction between demonstration and amplification in several passages of the *Histories*.

In one such passage, Polybius describes how the Roman military machine used encomium to positive effect (6.39.1–2):

καλῶς δὲ καὶ τοὺς νέους ἐκκαλοῦνται πρὸς τὸ κινδυνεύειν. ἐπειδὴν γὰρ γένηται τις χρεία καὶ τινες αὐτῶν ἀνδραγαθήσωσι, συναγαγὼν ὁ στρατηγὸς ἐκκλησίαν τοῦ στρατοπέδου, καὶ παραστησάμενος τοὺς δόξαντάς τι πεπραχέναι διαφέρειν, πρῶτον μὲν ἐγκώμιον ὑπὲρ ἐκάστου λέγει περὶ τε τῆς ἀνδραγαθίας, κἄν τι κατὰ τὸν βίον αὐτοῖς ἄλλο συνυπάρχη τῆς ἐπ' ἀγαθῶν μνήμης ᾧξιν . . .

They [the Romans] have an excellent way of inducing the young men to face danger. Whenever there has been an engagement and some of the troops have acted bravely, the general calls an assembly of the legion and puts those whom he considers to have acted conspicuously on display. First, he pronounces an encomium for each of them regarding their bravery and whatever else they have done in their lives that is worthy of mention for its goodness.

28. Polybius' version of this election presents difficulties; cf. Walbank *HCP*, ad 10.4.1–5.8.

The process described here is consistent with amplification. In addition to whatever the soldier has done recently, the general adds anything else he can. These encomia inspire virtuous behavior, but the effect is apparently fleeting. The generals give these speeches whenever someone has behaved courageously. The speeches stimulate the soldiers to virtuous action, but they must be employed over and over again. Additionally, the *Histories* characterize the soldier, upon whom the encomium is so effective, as lacking a capacity for reason, especially as compared to the aristocratic political leader (1.84.6, 3.105.9). Polybius is unrelenting in the way he characterizes the soldier as the intellectual and moral inferior to the aristocratic man of action.²⁹

It is all the more significant, therefore, that encomium is consistently characterized as ineffective when directed at aristocratic leaders. The narration of the arrival of the Aetolian envoy Machatas in Sparta (219, at the beginning of the Social War) illustrates this point. Machatas speaks before the general assembly and gives a false and absurd encomium of the Aetolians in an attempt to get the Spartans to break their alliance with the Macedonians (ἀλόγως δὲ καὶ ψευδῶς ἐγκωμιάζων τοὺς Αἰτωλοὺς, 4.34.7). A spirited discussion follows until some distinguished elder citizens convince the assembly to maintain their alliance with the Macedonians, reminding the others present of the benefits of their association with Antigonos and the injuries they have suffered at the hands of the Aetolians. These citizens see past Machatas' epideictic oratory and make a sound decision by employing reason.

Something similar happens when Antiochos III consults with his council on how best to quell the rebellion engineered by Molon, the satrap of Media (5.49.3–4). One council member, a certain Epigenes, argues for immediate and decisive action; another, Hermeias, takes the opposite view, gives an encomium of himself, and makes accusations against Epigenes. Antiochos calmly chooses to follow Epigenes' advice. In the *Histories*, political leaders consistently overcome the powerful effect of the encomium; because they can reason, they are immune to the methods of the epideictic orator.

In contrast to amplification, the effect of demonstration is permanent and applicable to nearly any situation; it empowers the reader to make good decisions and to bear the many vicissitudes of fortune nobly. Polybius makes this point when he introduces Philopoemen in Book 10 (10.21.3–4):

καὶ γὰρ ἄτοπον τὰς μὲν τῶν πόλεων κτίσεις τοὺς συγγραφέας, καὶ πότε καὶ πῶς καὶ διὰ τίνων ἐκτίσθησαν, ἔτι δὲ τὰς διαθέσεις καὶ περιστάσεις μετ' ἀποδείξεως ἐξαγγέλλειν, τὰς δὲ τῶν τὰ ὅλα χειρισάντων ἀνδρῶν ἀγωγὰς καὶ ζήλους παρασιωπᾶν, καὶ ταῦτα τῆς χρείας μεγάλην ἐχούσης τὴν διαφορὰν ὅσῳ γὰρ ἂν τις καὶ ζηλώσει καὶ μιμήσασθαι δυνηθεῖται μᾶλλον τοὺς ἐμπύχους ἀνδρας τῶν ἀπύχων κατασκευασμάτων, τοσοῦτον καὶ τὸν περὶ αὐτῶν λόγον διαφέρειν εἰκὸς (πρὸς) ἐπ' ἀνθρώπων τῶν ἀκούοντων.

It is strange that historians narrate with demonstration the foundations of cities, when and how and by whom they were founded, and even their organization and surroundings, but they make no mention of the training and interests of the men who undertook all these things, even though these topics are of exceptionally great value. For by whatever degree one is more able to emulate and imitate living men than lifeless structures, to that same degree is an account of these men likely to excel at correcting the readers.

29. Cf. Eckstein 1995, 164–76; Champion 2004, 83.

Through the study of analyses such as those discussed here, the reader is corrected. It is unnecessary to read of Philopoemen every time one is faced with a decision in the same way one must be inspired by encomium before each battle. Encomium is protreptic; history, because of its demonstrative quality, is protreptic and descriptive. Encomium remains epideictic; history assigns praise and blame, invites the reader to judge, and encourages the reader to take particular action.

It is this combination of protrepticism and description that provides a link between the *Histories* and Plutarch's *Lives*, and possibly sheds light on the relationship of prose encomia and later biography. Luc van der Stockt has already argued that Polybius and Plutarch share the belief that their writing is useful.³⁰ Plutarch explicitly asserts that readers should employ histories in order to improve their own character (*De prof. virt.* 79b–c), an idea that echoes many of Polybius' views on the benefits of the study of the past. I would like to go further and argue that these authors use similar methods of moral didacticism, as illustrated by their treatments of Philopoemen.³¹

Polybius' admiration of Philopoemen is undeniable, and in the *Histories*, in accordance with his own programmatic demands, he devotes more attention to this figure's praise than to his censure. Philopoemen distinguishes himself at Sellasia (2.66.1–69.11). The outcome of the battle of Mantinea is due to his shrewd mind (11.16.4–9). In contrast, Polybius criticizes his behavior in the dispute with Archon (22.19). His treatment of Philopoemen's death, as Arthur Eckstein points out, provides all the information that supports later interpretations of recklessness.³² As we have seen in the treatment of other individuals, Polybius uses Philopoemen first to illustrate what virtuous behavior is and is not, and then to move the reader to emulation (23.14.12).³³

The comparison between Philopoemen and Aristaenus is another example of demonstrative consideration of individual behavior (24.11.1–13.10).³⁴ Both men are first praised for their particular virtues: Philopoemen for his military prowess, Aristaenus for his skill in politics, characteristics that play out in each man's proposal for the stance the Achaeans should take toward Rome in 198, after Flamininus' arrival in Greece. Aristaenus favors cooperation, Philopoemen resistance. The Achaeans adopt Aristaenus' position, and Polybius concludes that Philopoemen's stance was honorable, Aristaenus' was honorable on its face, and both were safe (24.13.8).

It is a remarkable position for Polybius to take. As Petzold has argued, Aristaenus' stance was somewhat unethical,³⁵ and though Polybius is not opposed to dissimulation, it comes as a surprise that he does not side with the more straightforward position of one of his heroes. Polybius' attempts to reconcile practical success with noble behavior is a major theme of the *Histories*, and in this passage, he appears to sacrifice honor to expediency.³⁶ Eckstein has

30. Van der Stockt 2005, 274.

31. For a thorough discussion of Plutarch's blend of protreptic and descriptive moralism, cf. Pelling 1995.

32. Eckstein 1995, 273.

33. On Polybius' beliefs on the "didactic value of individual lives," cf. Pomeroy 1986, 407–8.

34. For a detailed discussion, cf. Eckstein 1987.

35. Petzold 1969, 46.

36. For the reconciliation, cf. Eckstein 1995, *passim*; for the sacrifice, Marincola 2001, 141.

argued that in siding with Aristaeus, Polybius had to make an “intellectual break” from not only his idol, but also his father, and he concludes that the presentation of the debate amounts to a defense of Aristaeus.³⁷ The account remains protreptic, but the behavior being presented for emulation is complex and nuanced. That nuance is achieved through a descriptive consideration of both men’s actions on more accounts than relative praiseworthiness.

Plutarch similarly praises and censures Philopoemen. He devotes more time than Polybius to Philopoemen’s valorous action after being wounded at Sellasia (*Phil.* 6). He includes an anecdote about his subject’s humility that is absent in the *Histories* (*Phil.* 2). But along with the praise comes criticism. Either cowardice or an overweening desire to win praise led the Achaean to serve as a mercenary for the Gortynians at a time when the Megalopolitans needed his leadership (*Phil.* 13). He treated the Spartans oppressively and out of hostility (*Phil.* 16), and in the end, he loses in the comparison to Titus Flamininus in the areas of justice and clemency (*Comp. Phil. et Flam.* 3.3–5). Plutarch’s account is protreptic to a certain degree, but the protreptic force is tempered by the criticisms of Philopoemen. Like Polybius, Plutarch aims to illustrate virtue, define it, and instruct how to achieve it.

5. THE INDIVIDUAL IN THE *HISTORIES*

Obviously, the individual is of paramount importance to Polybius. He believes that individuals direct the course of world events. He remarks that the character of an entire city changes with the character of its ruler (9.23.8), that the relative prosperity of nations can rest on the character of an individual (32.4), that individuals affected the destinies of Greece and Carthage (38.8.14). Because individuals are so important to history, it is no wonder that Polybius exerts so much effort drawing lessons from their experiences. He mentions twice that he discusses Hasdrubal in order to illustrate that he is worthy of emulation (11.2.4, 11). He can also draw a positive lesson from a negative example, as with Regulus, whose behavior should not be emulated (1.35).³⁸ Similarly, Polybius criticizes Marcellus for foolishly throwing away his life and endangering the fate of his army and homeland (10.32). This example is especially illustrative of the difference between the consideration of the individual in encomium and historiography, as dying in the service of one’s country is often praised without question. Polybius records a speech of Scipio Africanus in which he praises such sacrifice (15.10.3), and a willingness to die for one’s country is a characteristic of Polybius’ ideal man of action.³⁹

In the *Histories*, biographical material is introduced for the sake of analyzing its quality. Polybius considers the context of the characters’ decisions and actions, what choices they made and why, whether they succeeded or failed, if they behaved justly or not. Such consideration allows the readers to see deeper than first appearances, judge the quality of their own behavior, and develop a moral sense that will direct behavior, and perhaps even ensure their own

37. Eckstein 1987, 149.

38. For Polybius’ tendency to draw positive lessons from negative examples, cf. Pomeroy 1986, 411.

39. Cf. Eckstein 1995, 28–55, 118.

success in similar situations. Of course, Polybius was not the first historian to use biographical material for historical ends, nor the first to believe that a moral project was appropriate to historiography,⁴⁰ but he is the first to discuss the process in such detail.

CONCLUSIONS

In contrast to his views on the proper role of biographical material in history, Polybius' views on the appropriate use of encomium remain obscured. Because of his close knowledge of the form, it appears reasonable to assume that he intended the work to perform an epideictic function. Some have argued the *Philopoemen* was an apology intended to defend the statesman in Rome. But, as Pédech rightly objects, if this were true, Polybius could have called the work an apology.⁴¹ Petzold conjectures that the work was written for the education of young men, especially of Scipio.⁴² Against both views, Polybius' encomium appears less able than the *Histories* to effect a true rehabilitation of Philopoemen or to educate Scipio properly.

In fact, in the *Histories*, Polybius often justifies detailed analysis when the record demands correction. This is why he analyzes the characters and actions of Hannibal, Scipio Africanus, Aratus, and Philip V, as we saw above. Polybius might well have felt no need to address Philopoemen's acme in detail in the encomium as no competing versions of those events existed. On the other hand, maybe the reason was more personal. Polybius' reputation for sober-minded narration is widespread; it is possible that preference extended to encomium as well.⁴³ It is also possible that praise through amplification simply does not require the same detail as analysis through demonstration. That treatise would have been intended to convince the reader that Philopoemen deserved praise, but not to judge his behavior on other merits or to instruct the reader how best to implement its lessons in any particular or practical way.

We recall Marincola's assertion that, in speaking of ancient prose genres, one must consider the totality of each work rather than assuming that any one property determines its character. He suggests that five categories be considered when assessing genre: (1) whether a work is narrative or non-narrative, (2) focalization, (3) chronological limits, (4) chronological arrangement, and (5) subject matter.⁴⁴ To determine the generic relationship between Polybius' *Philopoemen*, his *Histories*, and Plutarch's *Philopoemen*, such a manifold approach is absolutely necessary.

Nevertheless, even works that are similar according to all of these criteria can remain distinct according to their genre. The works I have discussed are

40. Pownall (2003, 9) argues that "Xenophon, Ephorus, and Theopompus represent the transition from the historical aims and methods of Herodotus and Thucydides to those of Polybius" and suggests that "Socrates' search to elicit from his interlocutors the definitions of basic moral virtues in order to help them see the best method to achieve right conduct in their given sphere of life . . . seems to have induced both Plato and Xenophon . . . to use the past as a means of moral instruction of the elite" (21).

41. Pédech 1951, 89.

42. Petzold 1969, 13 n. 5. For a more complete discussion of possible motives and possible date of composition, cf. Walbank 1972, 14.

43. Cf. Marincola 2001, 111–12: "the opposite of 'research' is not 'rhetoric.'"

44. Marincola 1999, 302–9.

all narratives, they all consider the relative morality of individual behavior, they can all admit or deny partisanship and exaggeration. They all compare one individual to another and can treat events of the distant or recent past. Each can use similar chronological schemes and can accept similar subject matter. In Polybius' *Histories*, the primary distinction of genre each work displays, besides the author's explicit assignation to one or another, is a rhetorical stance.

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